NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/9

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
7 May 2018

Original: English

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: addressing the nuclear challenge of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Joint statement endorsed by Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

1. We, States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stress that the nuclear tests, including the latest on 3 September 2017, and the launches using ballistic missile technology, in particular of intercontinental range, conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are in clear violation of multiple unanimously agreed Security Council resolutions, and reiterate the international community's strong condemnation of these actions as expressed in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

2. The nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the extent of the progress achieved by the regime pose a grave and increasing threat to regional and international peace and security.

3. The pursuit by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of military nuclear and ballistic missile programmes also constitutes a grave threat to the international non-proliferation regime, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone. We remain determined to preserve the non-proliferation regime and to strengthen the Treaty.

18-07093 (E) 180518

Please recycle

4. We acknowledge the recent statement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announcing the suspension of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches and the closing of its nuclear test site as a first step towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

5. We welcome the inter-Korean summit held on 27 April 2018 and the "Panmunjeom Declaration". We emphasize the importance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea taking concrete actions and express our hopes for progress at the scheduled United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea summit and through ensuing efforts by all relevant parties.

6. We continue to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date and abandon its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

7. To this end, we reaffirm that we will faithfully and scrupulously implement and enforce the relevant Security Council resolutions and will further strengthen international cooperation.

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/10

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
7 May 2018

Original: English and French

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

Action 20 of the action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Canada submits the present report to further fulfil these commitments. This report updates the information provided in the reports submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee at its sessions held in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10), 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9), 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/8 and NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/9) and 2017 (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/10) and to the Review Conference in 2015 (NPT/CONF.2015/34).

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*

Nuclear disarmament

1 Canada's international security policy continues to promote non-proliferation and a progressive, step-by-step process towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, consistent with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations and in a manner that promotes strategic stability for all.

Canada promotes this policy with its allies and partners in NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, among others.

2 Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations, most notably through co-sponsorship of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper entitled "Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for

18-07278 (E) 150518

Please recycle

Action	Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017
	strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26). Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/50, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which emphasized the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada welcomed the adoption without a vote of General Assembly decision 72/514, entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification".
3	Not applicable
4	Not applicable
5	Not applicable
6	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Canada engaged constructively in the working group on the "way ahead" established by the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2090) in 2017 to advance discussions on disarmament issues, including nuclear disarmament.
7	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Canada engaged constructively in the Conference on Disarmament working group on the "way ahead" (CD/2090) in 2017 to address multiple disarmament issues, including general nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances.
8	Not applicable
9	Canada supports the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Canada joined the consensus on General Assembly resolution 72/24, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", and resolution 72/22, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty"; Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/45, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".
10	Not applicable
11	Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 2 December 1998. Canada's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Implementation Act is being implemented provisionally pending the Treaty's entry into force.
12	Canada provides annual updates on its efforts to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
13	Canada participated in the Article XIV Conference on 20 September 2017, co-chaired by Belgium and Iraq, and supported the Conference's final declaration, which, inter alia, called for concrete and actionable steps towards early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada co-sponsored and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/70, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Canada also co-sponsored Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), which, inter alia, called for the Treaty's early entry into force and for all States to maintain voluntary moratoriums on nuclear test explosions.
14	All of the 16 stations and laboratories hosted by Canada as a part of the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have been completed and certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In February 2017, Canada hosted a cold-weather airborne field test in Ottawa that involved the use of airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in September 2013. In December 2017, Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding to fund the development of a cooperating national facility monitoring station in Kazakhstan that will help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to detect nuclear explosions.
15	Canada has actively called for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament or in another international forum. Nominated by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/259, Canada is chairing the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group in 2017–2018 to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. In July and August 2017, Canada chaired the first two-week session of the preparatory group in Geneva. As part of this two-year process, in February 2018, Canada also chaired a second informal consultative meeting in New York, open to all States Members of the United Nations, to share views and discuss interactively the work of the preparatory group. At the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored Assembly decision 72/513 on the fissile material cut-off treaty.
16	Not applicable
17	Canada continues to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that surplus fissile material no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed (applicable only to nuclear-weapon States).
18	In conformity with its legal obligations through its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as verified by regular IAEA inspections, Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
19	Canada participates actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, including all four plenaries to date, and is represented in each of the three working groups. Canada also engages in the intersessional meetings of the working groups and is contributing to discussion papers. Canada supported resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification, adopted by the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, to create in 2018–2019 a Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification. Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to support the efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to serve as secretariat of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.
20	
21	Canada endorses the draft reporting form of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative for all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon States. This form was submitted at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee as a part of working paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17. Further recommendations concerning reporting by the nuclear-weapon States were put forward in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper entitled "Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26).
22	The International Security Research and Outreach Programme of Global Affairs Canada, in partnership with The Simons Foundation Canada, continues to support the enhancement of Canadian graduate-level scholarships on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. Four scholarships (totalling $20,000) are awarded annually, with $325,000 having been distributed since the programme's inception in 2003. On 20 April 2018, Global Affairs Canada held consultations with experts from Canadian civil society organizations and academia to promote transparency, openness and education on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.
Nuclear non-proliferation	
23	Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
24	Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA has been in place since 21 February 1972. Canada's additional protocol with IAEA has been in place since 8 September 2000.
25	Canada continues to urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA, which we consider is the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Within the context of IAEA, during negotiations of the resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards, Canada, in cooperation with other countries, resisted attempts to revise language that would eliminate the call for universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
26	Since 2005, IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Canada remains in peaceful purposes. This broader conclusion pursuant to Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
27	Canada welcomes the ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides a framework to establish confidence that the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are peaceful in nature through monitoring and verification by IAEA. To date, Canada has contributed $11.5 million to support IAEA efforts to monitor and verify the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its predecessor, the Joint Plan of Action. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and every subsequent year, Canada reiterated its condemnation of the illicit nuclear weapons development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including nuclear testing, the production of fissile material, both enriched uranium enrichment and separated plutonium, and ballistic missile testing. Canada continues to call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions, return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and every subsequent year, Canada also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues regarding its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, particularly with regard to the Dayr al-Zawr site and other functionally-related sites identified by IAEA.
28	Canada's additional protocol with IAEA was signed on 24 September 1998 and entered into force on 8 September 2000.
29	Canada continues to support the G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol thereto.
30	Not applicable
31	Not applicable
32	Canada welcomes IAEA efforts to apply the State-level concept to all States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. We look forward to the next report by the IAEA Director General, which will outline the Agency's experience in implementing updated State-level approaches.
33	Canada paid its 2018 assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full, in line with our sustained efforts towards timely and predictable payments.
34	Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
35	Canada is a member of and an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement and implements their commitments through a national export control system and nuclear cooperation agreements. In 2016, Canada submitted an updated national implementation action plan to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and regularly advocates for and calls on other nations to fulfil their reporting and action plan obligations in relation to resolution 1540 (2004). On 28 June 2017, Canada participated in Security Council open debates on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and called for the full and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
36	Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. Canada supports the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as outlined in section 56.
37	Canada's national export control system ensures that exports of controlled goods and technology, including nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, are not authorized where the proposed export would be inconsistent with Canada's foreign and defence policy (including where there is deemed to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or to an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations).
38	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place with 48 States, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy requires that all prospective nuclear partners, including both non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, must agree to — and conclude — a binding nuclear cooperation agreement before cooperation can commence. Nuclear cooperation agreements commit Canada's nuclear partners to comply with a set of non-proliferation policy requirements, notably that Canadian nuclear exports would be used only for peaceful, non-explosive end uses. Other requirements include prior consent for the high enrichment of uranium, reprocessing of spent fuel or retransfer of Canadian-supplied items to third countries; adequate physical protection; and provision for bilateral "fall back" safeguards in the event that the IAEA safeguards system becomes immobilized. All provisions are fully reciprocal. Nuclear cooperation agreements are required before exports of nuclear material, equipment or technology can take place.
39	Cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country, as well as their implementation of nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance and recommendations.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
40	Canada maintains the highest level of effective physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework that integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign Governments and international organizations. Canada was pleased to be the President of the IAEA International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, held from 13 to 17 November 2017, wherein IAEA member States took stock of measures to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced over Can$42 million for projects between 2016 and 2018 through Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide. These projects include funding for bilateral projects to combat illicit trafficking, improve physical protection of nuclear facilities, promote safe management and disposal of radioactive sources and improve transportation security. The projects also include funding for international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
41	Consistent with the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, Canada maintains strong physical protection measures for its nuclear materials, including armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.
42	Canada ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in December 2013 and welcomed its entry into force on 8 May 2016. Canada also supported a series of workshops aimed at promoting the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment to countries that had not yet done so. In March 2018, Canada supported a two-day workshop organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) aimed at over 30 countries that are not yet signatories to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment in order to advance universalization of those treaties. Through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Canada is also working on enhancing legislative frameworks to help countries with the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment (see section 44 below for more details).
43	Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, approved in September 2017. Canada provided funding to IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fifth International Conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, held in Vienna in June 2017.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
44	See action 40 regarding assistance to States parties with a view to strengthening national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Canada is an endorser of the Proliferation Security Initiative and an active member of its Operational Experts Group and chaired the Critical Capabilities and Practices Review Team from 2016 to mid-2018. In June 2017, Canadian Armed Forces personnel deployed to the Caribbean to take part in Exercise Tradewinds, during which Canada partnered with Trinidad and Tobago to develop counter-proliferation capacities simulating the interdiction of a merchant ship suspected of carrying illegal weapons of mass destruction-related materials. In June 2017, Canada became the Chair of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims to enhance partner countries' nuclear forensics capabilities in order to improve material accountancy and investigations into material out of regulatory control, including trafficked materials. Canada also provided assistance through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to remove high activity disused sealed radioactive sources from South America; to enhance regulatory frameworks for nuclear security in African States; to strengthen nuclear security in Ukraine; to support the INTERPOL subdirectorate for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and capacity-building activities in Latin America and South-East Asia; and to strengthen border security, counter nuclear smuggling and build critical incident response capacity in Jordan.
45	Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in November 2013. Fulfilling an action item in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit action plan in support of the United Nations, Canada co-hosted with UNODC an event celebrating the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on 5 December 2017. States parties met to take stock of implementation efforts to date and to identify areas of complementarity between the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This event aimed to help States parties with implementation efforts and to raise awareness among States that have yet to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In December 2017, Canada organized an event to mark the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in cooperation with UNODC to further the effective implementation of the Convention within States parties and to encourage signatories and non-signatories to advance their efforts towards ratification or accession. The Co-Chairs' summary of the event was circulated to IAEA member States as IAEA information circular INFCIRC/924 on 2 March 2018.
46	The technical capabilities of a country's system and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that system and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. Canada continues to work with IAEA to implement the updated State-level approach for Canada.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	
47	Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.
48	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place covering 48 States, in addition to a wide range of memorandums of understanding facilitating increased cooperation with partner countries and institutions.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
49	Canada provides experts, equipment and technology to many developing States parties through technical cooperation. Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements in place with many developing countries. Cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment. Canada provided $2.3 million to support the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratory (ReNuAL) project in 2016. We also provide expertise to support IAEA technical cooperation activities and regularly host related events in Canada, including in 2018. Additionally, through the weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme, Canada provides over $30 million per year in capacity-building projects that enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide, particularly in developing areas of the world, which has the effect of enhancing the accessibility of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
50	See action 49 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation with developing countries.
51	See actions 38 and 39 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation.
52	In the context of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, the Board of Governors and General Conference, Canada regularly proposes initiatives to improve the governance and management of the Technical Cooperation Programme, including: greater strategic management of the Programme; encouraging IAEA member States to pay their voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time; encouraging countries in a position to do so to contribute to funding their own technical cooperation projects through the government cost-sharing mechanism rather than drawing from the Technical Cooperation Fund; and encouraging the implementation of outcome monitoring for all technical cooperation projects.
53	Canada is continuing long-standing efforts to improve governance and management of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund through the IAEA policymaking organs and relevant working groups. Despite some progress in recent years, additional work remains to be done in the areas of strategic management, outcome monitoring, which countries draw on the Fund and member State payment of contributions to the Fund. Canada will continue to engage IAEA member States to encourage positive changes in these areas.
54	See action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
55	Canada contributed $3.2 million via the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in 2016–2018 and provided in-kind resources to Peaceful Uses Initiative projects.
56	Canada is an active and regular contributor of support and expertise to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada has hosted fellowship participants and scientific visitors from the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe and hosted Technical Cooperation Programme meetings in the areas of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Canadian lecturers and experts have contributed technical training in the areas of human health, agriculture and food security, water and the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
57	See actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on comprehensive safeguards agreements, the additional protocol and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Nuclear Energy Act of 1985 (amended in 1997) relates to the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Canada. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act came into force in May 2000, replacing the Atomic Energy Control Act. It established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission as the national regulator and set out its mandate, responsibilities and powers. These include domestically regulating the development, production and use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security and the environment and to implement Canada's international commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
58	Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium bank, welcomes the progress made to date in establishing the bank and bringing it towards operation and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.
59	Canada ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in January 1990. Canada ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in December 1995. Canada ratified Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 1998. Canada ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in August 2002. See actions 42 and 45 for more information on the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Canada had ratified both instruments as of December 2013.
60	Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to the World Institute for Nuclear Security to develop a nuclear security support centre in Mexico that will provide the Central American region with additional support in enhancing nuclear security, including through the provision of certified training. Canada continues to provide in-kind support to IAEA for the development of IAEA safety standards and IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Canada actively participates in the review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and presided over the 2017 Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting. Canada has included engagement with the nuclear industry and the private sector on nuclear safety and security as a main theme of its G7 presidency in 2018 in the context of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Furthermore, as the inaugural convener of the Nuclear Security Contact Group in 2016–2017, Canada engaged closely with the Nuclear Industry Steering Group for Security in order to leverage the important and unique role that nuclear industry operators play in implementing nuclear security obligations.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
61	Canada is making good progress on its initiatives to reduce stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), including by repatriating HEU to the United States of America, in accordance with previous Nuclear Security Summit commitments to repatriate HEU spent fuel originating from the United States in 2010 and HEU liquid in 2012. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, leaders agreed to continue minimizing the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes, and in October 2016 Canada ceased routine production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) at the National Research Universal reactor. From November 2016 to March 2018, the reactor will remain in "hot standby" mode to produce isotopes as an "international supplier of last resort" in the event of a prolonged and unforecasted global shortage that cannot otherwise be mitigated. After March 2018, the reactor will be decommissioned and HEU repatriated to the United States. Consistent with its Nuclear Security Summit commitments, Canada is also decommissioning an HEU-fuelled research reactor at the University of Alberta. Canada will be participating in the International Symposium on HEU Minimization and Elimination, to be hosted by Norway in 2018, in order to take stock of international minimization and elimination efforts to date and to share updates on minimization efforts.
62	Canadian transport regulations for radioactive materials are based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.
63	On 1 January 2017, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act entered into force. Canada ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in June 2017.
64	Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA statute.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
7 May 2018
English
Original: English/French

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, Canada joined consensus on resolution 72/24, in which the Assembly called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Canada abstained on resolution 72/39, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", in which the Assembly, inter alia, called upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In keeping with its long-standing position on this issue, Canada also voted against resolution 72/67, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including a conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Canada continues to support broad consultations by the three convenors with all relevant stakeholders to arrive at modalities for a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada also continues to call for the universal and full adherence to and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2017, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution during that time period did not address serious breaches in compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by some other States in the region, as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada has also worked

Please recycle

with other States in the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically-motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

4. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We urge those States in the region that have signed an additional protocol to ratify it without further delay.

5. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 72/70 at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, as well as Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), adopted in September 2016, and continues to encourage all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure. Canada is also providing funding and technical support to construct, test and certify a radionuclide monitoring station in Kazakhstan as a cooperating national facility to strengthen the capacity of the Treaty's International Monitoring System to verify compliance with the Treaty.

6. Canada continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between the five plus one group (P5+1) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Canada remains seriously concerned about the long-term nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its history of nuclear proliferation and its ongoing ballistic missile programme, we believe the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can effectively constrain the country's nuclear programme, so long as the Plan of Action is fully and verifiably implemented. Since 2014, Canada has contributed $12 million to support IAEA verification of the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We believe it is in the interest of the international community for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to be maintained in order to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. The Islamic Republic of Iran must continue to fully implement all of the commitments it agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to build the international community's confidence that the country's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful in nature. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action subjects the Islamic Republic of Iran to an extensive international verification regime that provides the international community with a high degree of insight into the country's nuclear programme. Canada welcomes the provisional application by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Additional Protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, but urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to expeditiously ratify the Additional Protocol as an additional confidence-building measure.

7. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic that suggest nuclear cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada fully supported the IAEA Board of Governors resolution (GOV/2011/41), in which the Board requested the IAEA Director General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dayr al-Zawr, in breach of the safeguards obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic. While recognizing the challenges posed by the current security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the cooperation, information and access necessary to address the country's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues". We also continue to urge the Syrian Arab

Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. Only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA can the Syrian Arab Republic restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme. We note with regret that the Syrian Arab Republic will assume the next presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, given its record of chemical weapons attacks in disregard of international norms and law.

8. Canada continues to call on all remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, which are referenced in paragraph 1 of the present report.

9. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

10. Canada has followed up on its Nuclear Security Summit pledges by promoting nuclear security around the world, including in the Middle East region. To date, Canada has provided over $16 million in funding to Jordan to strengthen its nuclear detection capabilities to combat nuclear trafficking and smuggling, including through the installation of radiation monitoring equipment at key border points and by establishing a training centre to counter nuclear smuggling. As a part of more than $40 million provided to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, Canadian funds have been used to safely and securely remove disused sealed radioactive sources from Lebanon and strengthen the physical protection and cybersecurity of nuclear facilities in Egypt.

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
4 May 2018

Original: English

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Chair's Reflections on the State of the NPT

It has been 50 years since the NPT was adopted, an appropriate moment to reflect on the role and achievements of the Treaty, as well as the challenges ahead.

In the fifty years since its inception, the NPT, together with the legacy of its Review Conferences, has grown into a comprehensive source of legal obligations and commitments. It has become the centerpiece of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, combining a near-universal scope with a legally binding framework for both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Its review cycle meetings provide States parties with a global platform to address issues in the areas of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Over the years the NPT has been tested and challenged. It has faced and weathered arms races, conflicts, major-power rivalries, geopolitical shifts, and perennial disagreements regarding its implementation, as well as proliferation threats in multiple corners of the world. Yet, through constant maintenance and strengthening, it has endured, adapted successfully to changing circumstances and evolved to meet challenges. The Treaty's impressive record demonstrates the essential role the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime plays in the maintenance of international peace, security and development.

The NPT has been instrumental in containing nuclear threats. It has curtailed the number of states that have acquired nuclear weapons and provided a reliable framework for some to relinquish their possession or to abandon military nuclear programs. It spurred the creation of effective verification regimes and monitoring systems, and paved the way for thriving cooperation on the development of safe nuclear energy and a range of other civilian applications that are so important for the sustainable development of the entire planet and its inhabitants.

The NPT once again faces a fragile and unpredictable international environment. States parties' opinions are divided over a number of issues, not least over the pace of disarmament. This was markedly felt during some of the PrepCom debates. We have not succeeded in resolving of a number of outstanding issues accumulated over the review cycles, some of which are outlined below. Yet, even if the Treaty is arguably not perfect, it is *the only one* that unites us all in the pursuit of the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. It will not be replaced in the foreseeable future by any instrument that could match the NPT in its

18-07614 (E) 110518

Please recycle

comprehensiveness, universality, or the flexibility offered by the integral improvement mechanism of review conferences.

Issues

In the remaining two years of the current review cycle we must carry the discussion forward in several areas:

- Our approaches still differ noticeably as regards the modalities and the pace of disarmament efforts. This gap will have to be bridged to reinvigorate the review process and pave the way for more consensual work. The recommendations of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament contain a number of useful ideas in that regard.
- Current issues in nonproliferation have reopened the discussion on the role and comprehensiveness of nuclear safeguards, as well as on the question of non-compliance. In light of recent developments, these issues will need to be conclusively revisited.
- A way forward should be found on the operationalization of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. New creative ideas and genuine engagement by all stakeholders in this process are required to overcome the stalemate.
- In the domain of peaceful uses we should strive to develop new initiatives to optimally unfold the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation, reconciling rigid non-proliferation standards with sustainable development goals.
- Crucial steps on important components of the regime, including an FMCT or a robust verification and compliance mechanism for nuclear disarmament, still remain ahead of us, which breeds concerns about its comprehensiveness and effectiveness. Further work is also required to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT.

Considering the above, and building on the reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, the Chair invites the States parties to the Treaty to consider building on the following points in their further discussions towards the 2020 Review Conference. He takes these points to reflect basic views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its review cycle that appear to be shared by its States parties:

- The NPT remains of central importance to its States parties, which have reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and the implementation of its provisions. The Treaty and its review cycle underpin our legal and political efforts on non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- The Treaty is the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and is a fundamental part of the global collective peace and security architecture. Current international geopolitical challenges underline the important role of the Treaty and the need to uphold and strengthen it.
- As its preamble reflects, the Treaty aims to safeguard its States parties and their peoples from the devastation of nuclear conflict. Regional and global security challenges impact the realization of the Treaty's objectives and therefore are rightfully considered during its review. At the same time, the implementation and development of the Treaty helps ease tensions and build confidence, contributing to a safer, more secure and more peaceful world.
- The Treaty contains shared common objectives. Despite disagreements over the pace of its implementation, progress on disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are considered to be mutually enabling, reinforcing and balancing elements.

- Therefore, it is the shared responsibility of States Parties to deliver on their commitments across all three pillars, to maintain a common purpose and ownership, and to make sure that all States parties can advance new constructive ideas in order to implement and develop the Treaty.

- The Treaty is a dynamic instrument, successfully evolving to adapt to changing political, technological, military and other circumstances. States parties must ensure its vitality and integrity, and continue to work towards the universalization of the Treaty.

- The Treaty benefits all its States parties and plays an important role in regional dialogues on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The broad ownership of the Treaty is one of its strengths and should be further stimulated.

- States parties to the Treaty should aim to maintain an open, inclusive and transparent dialogue at the meetings of the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee. To the extent discussions on divisive topics belong to the core of the review cycle, they should not impede progress on other issues.

- With a view to the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force in 2020, we should work to identify areas where progress is possible, cooperate in order to move forward and search for compromise where necessary. Although approaches regarding the modalities and the pace of disarmament efforts contrast, we must reconcile in order to reinvigorate the review process and pave the way for consensus-based work.

The 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee saw a clear benefit in exploring options to reform the working methods of review cycle meetings to make them more efficient and effective. This should be an important topic at the 2019 session of the Preparatory Committee as well as the 2020 Review Conference. Current ways of cooperation between the chairs could set a precedent for how to manage the process with more efficiency and cohesion. The Chair offers the following for further consideration:

- As the 2020 Review Conference nears, our ideas on its outcomes will have to mature, along with our ideas on how to achieve them. We should discuss how we can build on the outcomes of the 2017 and 2018 Preparatory Committee sessions, and even more importantly, how we can conclude the 2019 Preparatory Committee successfully.

- Meetings of the Preparatory Committee should become more output-oriented if they are to serve as important stations in the process of cumulative consensus building. Finding ways to maximize the continuity of the review cycle is of great importance in this context.

- The right balance must be maintained in discussing emerging, current and structural topics related to the subject matter of the Treaty.

- The approach consisting of a program of regional outreach meetings facilitates and increases transparency and inclusivity, thus raising the sense of ownership of the NPT regime.

- Timely nominations and the establishment of the Conference Bureau early in the process are measures that could become routine procedure to strengthen the review process in practice. In the context of this review cycle it is vital that the President of the Review Conference is nominated without delay.

- The establishment of a working group at the 2020 Review Conference could provide a dedicated forum for advancing and debating ideas.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
10 May 2018

Original: English

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session

I. Introduction

1. In accordance with the decision taken at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the second session of the Preparatory Committee was held in Geneva from 23 April to 4 May 2018.

2. The second session of the Preparatory Committee was opened on 23 April by Adam Bugajski (Poland), Chair of the second session of the Committee.

3. At the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 23 April, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, delivered a statement.

4. Also at the 1st meeting, the Chief Coordinator, Director General's Office for Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency, Cornel Feruta, delivered a statement.

5. Also at the 1st meeting, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo, delivered a statement.

6. The following 112 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its second session: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav

Please recycle

Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

7. The Preparatory Committee held 19 meetings, of which summary records were provided for the opening meeting (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.1), the general debate (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.1–6) and the closing meeting (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.18–19), in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee. The summary records are issued separately from the present report (see annex).

8. Ioan Tudor, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Preparatory Committee. Cornel Feruta, Chief Coordinator, Director General's Office for Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency, represented the Agency.

II. Substantive and procedural issues

A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

9. The Preparatory Committee continued to conduct its work on the basis of the agenda (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7) adopted at its first session, in 2017, which reads as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chair.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.
6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995; the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.
7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:
   (a) Election of officers;
   (b) Dates and venues for further sessions;
   (c) Methods of work:
      (i) Decision-making;
      (ii) Participation;
      (iii) Working languages;
      (iv) Records and documents.

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference:

(a) Dates and venue;

(b) Draft rules of procedure;

(c) Election of the President and other officers;

(d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;

(e) Provisional agenda;

(f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;

(g) Background documentation;

(h) Final document(s).

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

10. At its 1st meeting, on 23 April, the Preparatory Committee took note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/3/Rev.1), as well as the summarized indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/4).

11. In the course of the discussion on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 7), the following decisions were taken:

(a) Election of officers

With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference.

Pursuant to the understanding referred to in the paragraph above, at its 1st meeting, on 23 April, the Preparatory Committee elected Ambassador Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob (Malaysia) to serve as Chair of its third session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.1).

(b) Dates and venues for further sessions

At its 1st meeting, the Preparatory Committee decided to hold its third session in New York from 29 April to 10 May 2019 (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.2).

(c) Methods of work

(i) Decision-making

At its 1st meeting, the Preparatory Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that a consensus could not be reached, the Committee could then take decisions in accordance with

the rules of procedure of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

(ii) Participation

Pursuant to the relevant rules of procedure and the decision taken at its first session, the Preparatory Committee took note of the requests from specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations to attend its meetings as observers.

The following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; the European Union; the International Committee of the Red Cross; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; the League of Arab States; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Furthermore, representatives of 66 non-governmental organizations (see NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/5/Rev.1) attended the meetings of the Committee.

(iii) Working languages

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.

12. The Preparatory Committee set aside six meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 4), in the course of which 87 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.1–6). Furthermore, the Committee invited the representatives of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the League of Arab States to make statements at the end of the general debate. The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross also addressed the Preparatory Committee at the end of its 8th meeting.

13. At its 5th meeting, on 25 April, the Preparatory Committee heard 18 statements by non-governmental organizations.

14. The Preparatory Committee held a total of 11 meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 6.

15. The discussion was structured according to an indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/3/Rev.1), which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

16. The Preparatory Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/1, annex V):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security (articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered

in this cluster); security assurances (Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995); effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons);

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; article VII);

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II (articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V); other provisions of the Treaty.

17. The Preparatory Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

(a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;

(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;

(c) Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty.

The Committee also considered the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

B. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference

18. In the course of the discussion on the organization of the 2020 Review Conference (agenda item 9), the following actions were taken:

(a) Dates and venue

At its 1st meeting, on 23 April, the Preparatory Committee decided to hold the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2020 (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.3).

(f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

In response to a request made by the Preparatory Committee at its first session, the Secretariat provided the Committee with an estimate of the costs of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee (see NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/1). These costs are based on the estimated number of documents to be produced at the Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

C. Documentation

19. During the session, the Preparatory Committee had before it the following documents:

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/1	Estimated cost of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: note by the Secretariat
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2	Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Switzerland
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/3	Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: summary update to the reports submitted by Austria
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/4	Financial report
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/5	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Japan
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/6	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: national report submitted by New Zealand
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/7/Rev.1	Joint Statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/8	Implementation of the Action Plan Agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Australia
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/9	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: addressing the nuclear challenge of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: joint statement endorsed by Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/10	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/11	Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12	Reflections of the Chair on the state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.1	Nuclear cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Egypt
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.2	The role of nuclear weapons in security and defence doctrines: working paper submitted by Egypt
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.3	Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by Egypt
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.4	Strengthening nuclear safety: working paper submitted by Switzerland
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5	Addressing "Vienna issues": the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; nuclear security; and discouraging withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.6	Nuclear disarmament verification: working paper submitted by the European Union
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.7	Fissile material cut-off treaty: working paper submitted by the European Union
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.8	Framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation: working paper submitted by France
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.9	Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.10	Nuclear weapons and security: a humanitarian perspective: working paper submitted by Austria
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.11	Conclusions from the first session and recommendations for the second session of the Preparatory Committee: working paper submitted by the Netherlands
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.12	Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material under article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America as the members of the Zangger Committee

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.13	Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: reiterating the urgency of its implementation: working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.14	Nuclear security in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Australia, Canada and Spain
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.15	Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.16	Regional issues: Middle East: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.17	Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.18	Nuclear testing: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.19	Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.20	The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.21	Safeguards: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.22	Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.23	Verification: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.24	Action to strengthen the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.25	The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26	Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.27	Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.28	Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.29	Nuclear safeguards standards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30	Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND): working paper submitted by the United States of America
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.31	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.32	Nuclear issues: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33	Establishing Regional Conditions Conducive to a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems: working paper submitted by the United States of America
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.34	Specific regional issues and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.34/Add.1	Specific regional issues and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States: addendum
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.35	Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.36	Democratic People's Republic of Korea: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.37	Note verbale dated 20 April 2018 from the Government of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Chair of the Committee: working paper submitted by Japan
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.38	Impact and empowerment: the role of gender in the Non-Proliferation Treaty: working paper submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.39	New Agenda Coalition comments on Draft Chair's factual summary (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3): working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.40	Comments on the Chair's summary (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3): working paper submitted by Brazil
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.41	Chair's factual summary (working paper)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/1	Information for States parties, observer States and intergovernmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/1/Add.1	Information for States parties, observer States and intergovernmental organizations: accreditation and registration procedures: addendum
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/2/Rev.1	Information for participation by non-governmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/2 Rev.1/Add.1	Information for participation by non-governmental organizations: practical arrangements for accreditation, registration and issuance of grounds passes: addendum
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/3/Rev.1	Indicative timetable
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/4	Indicative timetable (summarized)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/5/Rev.1	List of non-governmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/6	List of participants
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/7	List of secretariat officers
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.1	Draft decisions on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3	Draft Chair's factual summary
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.4	Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/MISC.1	Provisional list of participants
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.1	Decision on the election of the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.2	Decision on the dates and venue for the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.3	Decision on the dates and venue for the 2020 Review Conference

20. A list of participants in the second session of the Preparatory Committee, including States parties, observers, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, is contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/6.

Annex

Summary records of the second session of the Preparatory Committee

The summary records will be issued individually in documents NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.1–6, 18 and 19.